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Macroeconomic fluctuations affect corporations’ performance through demand and cost 
conditions. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for 
management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences if management 
is unable to forecast macroeconomic fluctuations or unable to adjust operations in 
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. In this paper we analyze the impact 
of macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific factors on salaries and bonus of CEOs in 
131 Swedish corporations during the period 2001-2006. A distinction is made between 
anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. The macroeconomic 
influences on performance and compensation can be expected to vary from firm to firm 
in terms of magnitude of effects, as well as in terms of relevant macroeconomic 
variables. The estimates obtained in this paper refer to the average impact across the 
sample of firms. We find that the average Swedish CEOs’ compensation is explained to 
a substantial extent by macroeconomic factors; less so by unanticipated factors alone.  
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1.  Introduction  
Executive compensation is under scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the 
level of compensation in Europe is below that in the US, European compensation levels 
have been catching up and increased rapidly during the last five years. It is not only the 
level of compensation that causes debate but also the timing of large payments to 
executives relative to earnings of firms, and relative to increases in labor costs and real 
income in a country. There are times when the public perceives large payments to 
executives as particularly controversial. One possible source of such perceptions is 
developments in the macro economy. If, for example, performance linked compensation 
increases substantially as a result of domestic or international macroeconomic 
developments, these increases may be considered a windfall for management. If this 
happens during a period when unemployment is high and wage increases low, a high 
compensation level may be considered particularly undeserved. In other scenarios, the 
contribution of the macro economy to changes in compensation could be negative. One 
objective of this paper is to estimate what share of changes in executive compensation is 
explained by macroeconomic developments during the period 2001-2006. 
The economic motivation for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on executive compensation is that changes in performance-based 
compensation caused by macroeconomic events may weaken or distort incentives of 
management to focus their efforts on enhancing the firm’s competitiveness and 
shareholder value. A large share of changes in compensation will be based on factors 
entirely beyond executives’ control, if macroeconomic drivers of performance cannot be 
forecast, or if production and sales efforts cannot be adjusted to take advantage of 
macroeconomic developments.  
Macroeconomic fluctuations can be expected to have a substantial impact on the 
performance of most firms and, thereby, on performance-linked compensation. The 
impact on the performance of any particular firm depends on the macroeconomic 
sensitivity of each firm’s particular business, and on what aspect of performance we are 
concerned about. Cash flows and earnings can be expected to be more sensitive to 
macroeconomic shocks than sales for most firms, since costs are netted out to obtain the 
former performance measures. The macroeconomic impact on stock market returns 
should be smaller than the impact on cash flows and earnings, since stock returns reflect   2
expectations for relatively long periods over which macroeconomic fluctuations tend to 
cancel out. Thus, the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on the time pattern of 
executive compensation payments will depend on the link between compensation and 
the different aspects of performance, as well as on the sensitivity of relevant 
performance measures to macroeconomic events. 
In Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) the case of Electrolux was used to illustrate 
how changes in performance can be decomposed into one “intrinsic” component and 
one component caused by macroeconomic developments. They used a set of domestic 
and foreign macroeconomic price variables (exchange rates, interest rates, price levels) 
to filter out the macroeconomic component from total changes in performance from 
quarter to quarter. The reason for using price variables is that they can be observed 
without a long lag. Therefore, they can be used to decompose very recent changes in 
performance and, thereby, to adjust compensation. The particular price variables 
employed in the decomposition could vary from firm to firm depending on product and 
market characteristics. 
In this paper we decompose changes in compensation rather than in a 
performance measure in order to analyze what share of compensation-changes were 
caused by anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic developments for the average 
Swedish publicly traded firms during the period 2001-2006. Presumably, changes in 
compensation net of these factors represent compensation for changes in firms’ 
“intrinsic” competitiveness. We control for industry factors as well. One set of 
macroeconomic variables are used in the decomposition for all firms. Thereby, the 
macroeconomic influences on performance in many firms could be underestimated, 
since the appropriate set of variables is likely to be firm-specific. 
Macroeconomic effects on compensation can occur through a number of 
channels depending on what aspects of performance affect salaries and bonus of CEOs. 
We distinguish between effects on salaries and on bonus and we analyze the extent to 
which the macroeconomic effects depend on their impact on common performance 
measures like sales and market values versus influences on salaries and bonus through 
aspects of performance that we cannot identify. Boards in some firms may have stable 
salaries and predetermined rules for bonus payments based on a particular performance 
measure. Other boards may set the CEO salary based on a number of criteria that can   3
vary from period to period but, nevertheless, create a systematic relation between 
macroeconomic factors and compensation.  
Some early studies of executive compensation across firms focused on the 
relation between CEO compensation and firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985; Murphy, 1985, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990), 
while other studies analyzed whether CEOs are rewarded for performance relative to the 
market or relative to industry factors (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 
1990; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005). Whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to 
firm size or firm profits is controversial due to a multicolinearity problem among the 
independent variables in the regressions (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Rosen, 1992). 
We focus on the impact of macroeconomic and industry factors, as well as firm-
specific factors, on salaries and bonus of CEOs in Swedish firms during the period 
2001-2006. After estimating the impact of macroeconomic factors along with firm and 
industry factors for the period 2001-2005, we ask how salaries and bonus would have 
developed for the average firm during the estimation period had they been independent 
of total and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. Using the same coefficients we 
also calculate the impact of macroeconomic factors on compensation in 2006 for a 
smaller set of firms. 
In Section 2, we discuss in more detail how managerial incentives are influenced 
by macroeconomic influences on compensation. The data set for compensation in the 
form of salary and bonus is described in Section 3. Firm-specific and industry factors 
explaining compensation are analyzed in Section 4. The contribution of macroeconomic 
factors to compensation and performance measures is estimated in Section 5 using 
cross-section and panel analyses. In Section 6 we decompose compensation each year 
into an “intrinsic” component and a component caused by macroeconomic factors 
distinguishing between the total impact of the macro economy and the unanticipated 
impact. In section 7 we test whether there is simultaneity between performance and 
compensation, and we ask whether the results hold across industries and size groups. 
Concluding comments follow in Section 8. 
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2.  Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Managerial Incentives 
Macroeconomic factors, as well as industry wide factors, are beyond managerial 
influence and control. To the extent these factors cannot be forecast, while influencing 
performance linked compensation, macroeconomic fluctuations create noise in the 
relation between compensation and the performance that can actually be influenced by 
management. Such noise weakens the incentive-effects of performance-based 
compensation schemes if managers are risk-averse (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). 
Management is able to reduce the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on 
performance measures and, thereby, on compensation by means of risk management 
techniques and investments in flexibility (real options). A risk averse manager, whose 
compensation depends on macroeconomic fluctuations, has the incentive to employ risk 
management techniques excessively, if shareholder value does not increase with 
reduced performance-variance (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Thus, to the extent 
compensation can be made independent of unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations, 
managers’ incentives with respect to risk management would be more closely aligned 
with shareholders’ objectives.  
Management may have some control over the impact of anticipated 
macroeconomic fluctuations on performance. For example, production capacity can be 
raised in response to a forecast of an increase in aggregate demand in the economy, or 
shifted towards countries with cost advantages in response to a forecast of changes in 
real exchange rates. Such changes in the production capacity and in other aspects of 
operations are likely to require some lead time. In some firms the lead time may exceed 
the time horizon for which macroeconomic developments can be forecast.  
The ability to adjust capacity and operations in response to changes in 
expectations about macroeconomic conditions varies across firms. If there is little 
adjustability within the time horizon for macroeconomic forecasting, then management 
cannot influence performance effectively in response to expected macroeconomic 
developments. Accordingly, if compensation were based on performance that depends 
on macroeconomic developments, managers could form expectations about increases or 
decreases in compensation based on expected macroeconomic developments. These 
expectations could bias managers’ incentives to exert effort effectively. Specifically, an   5
expected decrease in compensation could induce managers to try to compensate in the 
short term by measures that enhance short-term performance but not necessarily 
shareholder value. For example, they may be induced to speculate on changes in interest 
rates and exchange rates. An expected increase in compensation could induce 
management to relax their efforts to enhance performance in other ways, as well as 
induce them to speculate in financial markets. If compensation instead were based on 
performance net of macroeconomic influences, managers’ incentives would be to exert 
effort in areas where they would be able to increase shareholder value.  
There exist firms where capacity and operations can be adjusted relatively fast 
and effectively in response to expectations about macroeconomic developments. In this 
case, managers should have the incentive to make these adjustments. Compensation 
based on performance including expected macroeconomic influences, but excluding 
unanticipated macroeconomic influences, would provide appropriate incentives in these 
firms.  
Compensation based on total performance including all macroeconomic 
influences would provide appropriate incentives for management only if value-
enhancing adjustment of capacity and operations can be made immediately in response 
to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Such firms are most likely rare with 
possible exceptions in the service sector.  
Investments in flexibility (real options) increase shareholder value in many firms 
and they reduce the impact of relatively large changes in macroeconomic factors on 
performance measures. In other words, flexibility tends to introduce a non-linear 
relation between performance and risk-factors. Compensation schemes should be 
designed in such a way that they provide incentives to invest in flexibility to respond to 
macroeconomic events. Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) argue that if compensation is 
adjusted for macroeconomic fluctuations based on a fixed linear relation between these 
fluctuations and performance, then the incentives to invest in flexibility (real options) 
are retained. 
 
3.  The Compensation Data  
Our dataset covers compensation for CEOs as well as Board Chairmen. Data have been 
collected from annual reports for all Swedish firms listed on the stock exchange as   6
Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap
1   firms during the period 2001-2006. Only 
compensation in the form of cash disbursements, i.e. salaries and bonus, are included, 
while stock option awards are not included. Since the compensation to Board chairmen 
do not show much variation over time and many data-points are missing, we limit the 
analysis to CEOs. 
The firm’s specific factors are collected from DataStream, while the 
macroeconomic factors are obtained from EcoWin (Reuters) database. 
Table 1 reports mean and median compensation levels in million SEK for the 
CEOs in Swedish firms from the different lists on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
during the period 2001-2006. There are 131 firms during the period 2001-2005, but only 
83 firms for 2006. Therefore, the estimations below will be carried out using the sample 
2001-2005. The 2006 data will be used for “out of sample” prediction of 
macroeconomic influences based on estimates for the earlier years.  
The index for average CEO compensation for each year is displayed both in 
Table 1 (Index=100 in 2001) and in Figure 1. We can see that the compensation levels 
increased during the period 2001-2005 in all the firms as well as in different sub-groups 
of firms. On average, the compensation increased 42 percent. In the Large-cap firms it 
increased 36 percent. The largest increase, 63 percent, occurred in the Mid-cap firms 
while the increase in the Small-cap firms was 40 percent. Based on our smaller sample 
for 2006, the increase in compensation continued to an average index of 158 in this year. 
For Large-cap, Mid-cap and Small-cap firms the 2006 index figures reached 140, 169 
and 141, respectively. 
 
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 Here) 
 
In Table 2 a distinction is made between salary and bonus for the years 2002-
2006. The firms included in Table 2 are the same as in Table 1. The year 2001 is 
excluded here because we could not separate the bonus from the salary for this year. 
Some firms did not pay bonus at all during the period while others may have paid bonus 
only in some years. It would seem to be reasonable to assume that when a firm starts to 
pay bonus it continues. A few firms stopped paying bonus during this period. In all 21 
                                                 
1 It is grouped according to the market capitalization of the firm. Large-Cap > 1 billion Euro; 150 mil 
Euro < Mid-Cap < 1 billion Euro; Small-Cap < 150 million Euro.   7
out of the 131 firms stopped bonus payments during the period but many more began 
paying bonus. In 2001, 68 firms did not pay bonus while in 2005 this figure had shrunk 
to 33. Table 2 shows that bonus payments increased much faster than salary payments. 
Bonus payments increased 165 percent, while salaries increased only 14 percent. The 
former figure takes into account both that average bonus payments increased and that 
the number of firms paying bonus increased. 
 
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
 
4.  Explaining Compensation without Macroeconomic Factors 
In order to first identify the most important firm-specific factors explaining CEO-
compensation, the above compensation sample is matched with firm performance 
variables. After eliminating the missing values in the firm performance sample, our final 
sample contains different numbers of firms in different years. Thus, the panel is 
unbalanced with a maximum of 126 firms and a minimum of 122 firms in the period 
2001-2005. The 2006 sample is not used in panel regressions since it contains only 83 
firms. 
We begin by analyzing how the cross-section variation of compensation levels 
(salary plus bonus) for the CEOs depends on a number of firm-and industry specific 
performance measures, and we ask whether the cross section pattern is stable over the 
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In order to minimize the multicolinearity problem, we focus on variables and 
ratios that exhibit relatively little correlation with each other. The firm’s total sale is 
used as a proxy for firm size. A number of performance variables were tested in 
equation (1) to find which one(s) explains compensation the best. The variables were 
return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q. We found that Tobin’s Q (measured as   8
market value relative to book value) had the most explanatory power and the least 
correlation with non-performance variables. Therefore, Tobin’s Q is used as the 
performance proxy from now on. Seven industry dummies are used to control for the 
industry factors.
2 
All the variables in the regressions in this study are in logarithms. Therefore, the 
regression coefficients are interpreted as “compensation-performance elasticities” rather 
than “compensation-performance sensitivities”. One of the advantages of the elasticity 
approach is that it produces a better “fit” in terms of marginal effects. Another 
advantage is that the elasticity is relatively invariant to firm size while sensitivities vary 
monotonically with firm size (larger firms having smaller betas) (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1992; Murphy 1998). 
Table 3 shows the results for equation (1) for each year and for pooled data. It 
can be seen that the elasticity with respect to sales remains fairly constant from year to 
year while the elasticity with respect to Tobin’s Q seems to have increased year by year 
from 2002. The elasticity coefficients for 2006 based on a smaller sample are very close 
to the coefficients in the pooled regression for 2001-2005. Nevertheless, we exclude 
2006 in the regressions below. 
The only industries showing a significant difference from the average are 
industry 4 (health care) and, to a lesser extent, industry 3 (financials). Compensation 
levels in these industries have increased relatively fast. 
 
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
 
Using the above firm specific factors, we estimate two random effects models 
with industry dummy variables in one and time dummy variables in the other. The 
results are reported in Table 4. The results for the random effects Model 1 with industry 
factors is very similar to the results for pooled data in Table 3 except that the dummy 
for industry 3 is not significant. Thus, competitive conditions in particular industries do 
not seem to influence compensation much. 
                                                 
2  The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) 
information technology and telecommunication services, and 7) materials.   9
The time dummy variables are highly significant in the second column of Table 
4. The coefficients increase each year from 2001-2005. The time pattern could be 
caused by macroeconomic influences. We return to this issue below.  
 
(Insert Table 4 Here) 
 
Are the patterns for salary and bonus different? It can be expected that the bonus 
component of compensation is more sensitive than the salary component to 
performance-variation over time and across firms. Therefore the model with industry 
dummies is also tested for Salary and Bonus separately. The results are shown in Table 
5. There are fewer observations for Salary and Bonus separately than for the sum of 
these components, because all observations of zero Bonus are excluded. The Salary 
component is explained mainly by sales, while Tobin’s Q has a strong effect on Bonus 
but no effect on Salary. Clearly and not surprisingly, compensation in the form of bonus 
is much more sensitive to performance from a shareholder perspective than salary 
compensation. The table also shows that the results for Salary plus Bonus are similar to 
the results for Bonus alone, although the coefficients for the total are generally smaller. 
Since the results are so similar, and since we have twice as many observations for total 
compensation as for Bonus alone, we focus on total compensation in the following 
analysis of macro-factors. 
 
(Insert Table 5 Here) 
 
5.  CEO-Compensation and Macroeconomic Factors 
In this section we turn to an analysis of the macroeconomic influences on CEO-
compensation. These influences can occur through the performance variables in 
equation (1) or through other variables influencing compensation. We investigate 
whether macroeconomic variables affect compensation independently of variation in Q 
and Sales, and we analyze macroeconomic influences on Q and Sales. The total 
macroeconomic influence on compensation is the sum of these effects. 
Macroeconomic conditions can be described using either quantity variables like 
GDP, GDP growth, investments and employment, or using price variables like interest   10
rates, inflation and exchange rates. Although the former group of variables describes 
macroeconomic conditions, they are typically observed with a substantial lag. Price 
variables, on the other hand, can be seen as easily observable signals of underlying 
macroeconomic shocks and developments. A shock would have a certain effect on a 
group of price variables as well as on GDP, employment, etc. but only the former would 
be observable at the time a shock occurs. Therefore, these signals can be useful tools for 
decomposing compensation and performance into “intrinsic factors” and 
macroeconomic factors. Another advantage of using price variables like interest rates 
and exchange rates in the decomposition is that they adjust rapidly to both domestic and 
foreign conditions affecting a firm’s performance. For these reason we prefer to use 
only price variables as proxies for macroeconomic conditions in the following.
3 
Specifically, we use exchange rates, interest rates, inflation and the market return in the 
stock market. 
It is likely that each firm’s performance is sensitive to its specific set of variables 
but here we employ one set to explain changes in compensation across firms and time. 
Thus, we obtain estimates for the macroeconomic impact on compensation for the 
average firm. Dummy variables for firm characteristics could be introduced in the 
analysis but we restrict the use of dummies to distinguish between industries as above, 
and to separate relatively export dependent firms from others. 
The following random effects model is specified to determine macroeconomic 
influences on compensation independently of variation in Q-values and sales:
4 
 
                                                 
3 An alternative formulation including GDP as well as price variables were tested as mentioned below. 
4 The random effects model is estimated directly because of the inclusion of industry dummy variables, 
which are invariant across time for each firm.   11
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The assumptions about expectation formation are described below. Given those 
assumptions the unanticipated exchange rate and the anticipated inflation dropped from 
the model due to multicolinearity. Model 1 in Table 7 shows the results without these 
variables. The unanticipated interest rate turned out to be insignificant. The correlations 
in Table 6 reveal that the correlation between the anticipated and the unanticipated 
exchange rate change is -0.95. Thus, we cannot identify whether anticipated or 
unanticipated exchange rate effects are the most important. For this reason we include 
the total exchange rate change in the following equation: 
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The results of the estimation of equation (2b) are presented as Model 5 in Table 
7. Before arriving at the formulations in equations (2a) and (2b) the market return in the 
stock market was included as another macro price variable that could serve as a signal 
of macroeconomic conditions. Neither the anticipated nor the unanticipated component 
of this variable was significant, however. Furthermore, an alternative specification of 
macroeconomic factors including GDP, the market return and the exchange rate change   12
was tested. The explanatory value of this formulation including GDP was much lower 
than the present formulation. This result supports the idea that price variables serve as 
useful signals of macroeconomic conditions. 
 The construction of anticipated and unanticipated changes in price variables can 
be described using the following time line. The average yearly observations of interest 
rates, exchange rates, and consumer prices are observed in each period. On the time line 
period t is 2002.  
 
The following assumptions are made with respect to the formation of 
expectations: The expected interest rate in the next period is equal to the current interest 
rate. Thus, 
 
1 − = t t i rate interest d Anticipate  
1 − − = t t t i i rate interest ted Unanticipa  
 
The return on the 1-year Government bond is used as the interest rate.  
The expected exchange rate change over the next year is reflected in the current 
one-year interest rate differential (uncovered interest rate parity). Thus, 
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The exchange rate is SEK/US Dollars. All the changes are in percent. 
The expected inflation over the next year is equal to the inflation last year. Thus, 
 
2 1 − − − = Δ t t t cpi cpi inflation d Anticipate  
[ ] [ ] 2 1 1 − − − − − − = Δ t t t t t cpi cpi cpi cpi inflation ted Unanticipa  
 
The correlations between variables we have in cross-section and all other 
variables are reported in Table 6. Among the price variables for which we have only 
five observations, the market return is highly correlated with several other price 
 
     Year 2001 
           t-1 
     Year 2002 
           t 
     Year 2003 
           t+1 
     Year 2000 
           t-2   13
variables. This correlation explains why the market return is not significant in the 
regressions. 
 
(Insert Table 6 Here) 
 
  Table 7 shows the results when equation (2) is tested using the random effects 
model.
5 When macroeconomic variables are included in the random effects model with 
firm specific and industry factors, the time dummies must be dropped. There are some 
differences among the five models presented. In Model 1, both anticipated and 
unanticipated interest rates are included. As noted, the latter is insignificant and dropped 
to arrive at Model 2 in the table. In Model 3, a dummy for relatively export oriented 
firms has been added on its own and interactively with the exchange rate. The 
interactive term is insignificant and dropped in Model 4. Finally in Model 5, the full 
exchange rate change is substituted for the anticipated exchange rate change, since the 
correlation between the variables is almost perfect (and negative). 
 
(Insert Table 7 Here) 
 
The results in Table 7 show that CEO salaries and bonuses are positively and 
significantly related to firm size and firm performance after controlling for 
macroeconomic influences. The coefficients for both Sales and the Q-values are smaller 
when macroeconomic influences are included explicitly in Table 7 in comparison with 
Tables 3 and 4. Thus, it seems that macroeconomic influences occur through Sales and 
Q, as well as through other channels. These other channels could be earnings or other 
firm-specific performance measures. The particular variables used by corporate boards 
to determine CEO compensation may even change from year to year. The fact that Sales 
and Q are the performance variables with the greatest explanatory value indicates that 
                                                 
5  The robustness of the random effects model, Model 5, is further tested by using two alternative 
specifications, i.e. pooled, and fixed effects. Based on Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test and 
Hausman test, the pooled and fixed effects models can be rejected, yet the random effects model cannot 
be rejected. In addition, in order to detect multicolinearity among all the factors, the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are estimated by using the pooled regression. The average VIF is 2.38, and the individual 
VIF is within the range 1.26-4.44. Therefore, multicolinearity does not seem a problem in the model. 
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much of the variation in compensation is linked to a time-varying set of performance 
indicators. 
CEO compensation changes by about 2.4% for each 10% change in firm size, 
and it changes about 0.8% for each 10% change in firm performance as measured by Q. 
The former finding is consistent with some findings from the US markets. Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005) find in a US sample for the period 1993-2003 that a 10% change in the 
firm size results in a 2.14% change in CEO compensation. They also find that a 10% 
change in performance leads to a 2.11% change in compensation. Our results before 
controlling for macroeconomic factors in Table 3 are consistent with these figures, but 
when we control for macroeconomic factors the compensation effect of a change in 
performance in Table 7 is less than a third of the effect in Table 3. In Section 7 below 
we ask whether this result is robust when we allow for simultaneity between 
performance and compensation. 
Turning to the results for macroeconomic factors in Table 7, the anticipated 
interest rate is negatively related to compensation. CEO compensation increases by 
about 12% for each 1% point decline in the interest rate (approximately equal to 1% of 
1+Anti. interest rate). 
The results for exchange rate effects are harder to interpret as a result of the high 
negative correlation between the proxies for anticipated and unanticipated exchange rate 
changes. The proxy for anticipated exchange rate changes is positively correlated with 
changes in compensation meaning that a depreciation of the SEK relative to the USD 
raises compensation, while the proxy for unanticipated changes indicates the opposite.  
As noted, the anticipated changes are almost perfectly correlated with unanticipated 
changes and, therefore, with total exchange rate changes. We can simply not identify 
whether effects of exchange rates are due to anticipated or unanticipated changes 
although the variation in floating exchange rates tends to be dominated by unanticipated 
changes. In Model 5, where the total exchange rate change is included, a depreciation of 
the SEK has a negative effect on compensation. This sign is hard to explain for export-
oriented industries. It makes more sense for multinational firms with large parts of their 
production abroad.   15
The export dummy interacting with the exchange rate change is insignificant in 
Model 5. Exporting firms seems to have had a faster growth of compensation, however, 
as shown by the significant export intercept dummy.
6 
We turn now to the impact of macroeconomic factors on the performance 
measures, Sales and Q that systematically affect compensation. The following equation 
is estimated for the Q-value: 
 




t i t i
t i t i
u dummies Industry
dummy Export CPI Unanti Log
rate exchange Log rate interest Anti Log





, 3 , 2
, 1 0 ,
) . 1 (
) 1 ( ) . 1 (






+ Δ + +




          (3) 
 
The Q-value is made a function of Sales, the macroeconomic variables identified above, 
and dummy variables in equation (3). The regression for Sales includes the Q-value, as 
well as the same macroeconomic and dummy variables. 
Table 8 shows that Sales has a small negative impact on Q when controlling for 
macroeconomic factors. This result indicates that sales generally are higher than what 
value maximization would call for. The anticipated interest rate has a strong negative 
effect on both variables. The exchange rate change affects Sales but not Q-values. A 
depreciation increases Sales as can be expected. The export dummy variable is also 
positive and significant indicating that the sales from export oriented firms are larger 
than sales from other firms. Unanticipated inflation is positively related to Q, but there 
is no significant relation with Sales. 
 
(Insert Table 8 Here) 
 
In the next section the estimates of macroeconomic influences on Sales, Q-
values, and on compensation at constant levels of Sales and Q will be used to 
                                                 
6 The compensation for the CEOs in the export firms is about 30% (which is (e
0.206-1)*100) higher than in 
the non-export firms. 
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decompose compensation into one component explained by “intrinsic factors” and one 
component explained by macroeconomic factors. 
 
6.  Filtering out Macroeconomic Influences on Compensation 
How would compensation have developed if the impact on compensation of macro-
factors would have been filtered out? Table 9a shows the impact on compensation of the 
total change in the macro variables for the period 2001-2005, while Table 9b displays 
the impact of unanticipated changes in macro variables. In Table 10 the coefficients 
above are used out of sample to analyze the impact of macro variables on compensation 
in a smaller sample of firms for 2006. 
In each of the tables 9a-10 column (1) shows the percent of salary plus bonus 
caused by macroeconomic variables each year at constant levels of Q and Sales. 
Columns (2) and (3) show the percent of Q and sales explained by the same variables. 
Column (4) presents the sum of the effects in columns (1)-(3) using the coefficients in 
Table 7 Model 5 as weights. Thus, column (4) shows the percent of salary plus bonus 
explained by macroeconomic factors each year. In columns (5) and (6) we show the 
macroeconomic effects as percent of bonus payments only. The macroeconomic effects 
included in Tables 9b and 10b are caused by unanticipated changes alone. 
Macroeconomic effects are calculated based on deviations from mean levels of 
the macro variables during the period times the coefficients in Table 7, Model 5. The 
procedure for calculating macroeconomic effects on Q and Sales is the same, but the 
coefficients are obtained from Table 8. The mean levels of unanticipated changes are 
zero. 
Column (4) in Table 9a reveals that the macroeconomic factors through all three 
channels had a large negative effect on compensation in 2001 (-16.6%). Thereafter the 
macroeconomic factors had an increasingly positive effect on compensation each year 
through 2005. In 2005 macroeconomic factors explained 21% of the compensation. 
Table 10a shows that the trend continued in 2006. The average share of compensation 
explained by macroeconomic factors is only around two percent. This small average 
effect is the result of our assumption that macroeconomic effects occur when the 
variables deviate from their mean values. 
The total macro effects in column (4) are dominated by the independent effects   17
in column (1) although the macro effects on both Q and Sales are substantial.  
The total macroeconomic effects each year as percent of bonus payments only 
are presented in columns (6). Since bonus is only a part of total compensation the 
macroeconomic effects here are larger. Table 10a shows that in 2006 macroeconomic 
factors contributed to compensation an amount nearly equal (93.75%) the bonus 
payments. 
 
(Insert Table 9a, 9b and 10 Here) 
 
The contribution of unanticipated macroeconomic effects are shown in Table 9b 
for the period 2002-2005 and in 10b for 2006 under the assumption that the regression 
coefficients based on the period 2001-2005 are valid for 2006 as well. The unanticipated 
changes in macro variables include effects of exchange rate changes and inflation, and it 
is assumed that all exchange rate changes are unanticipated.  
The contribution of unanticipated macroeconomic factors to compensation is 
smaller than the total effects in the previous table. The time pattern is also very different. 
Table 9a Column (4) shows that the largest positive impact of unanticipated macro 
factors on compensation between 2001 and 2005 occurred in 2003 (9%). The lowest 
effect occurred the year after (-3%). Clearly, it would make a large difference whether 
compensation levels would be adjusted for total macroeconomic influences or only 
unanticipated influences. 
The unanticipated macroeconomic effects on compensation are quite large 
relative to bonus payments some years as shown in column (6). In 2003 compensation 
explained by unanticipated macroeconomic variables amounted to more than half of the 
bonus payments (58.53%). In 2006 the figure declined to 13% as shown in table 10b. 
The effect of macroeconomic variables on changes in compensation is 
sometimes even larger than the figures mentioned so far. Considering that the total 
macroeconomic effect goes from negative 17% in 2001 to positive 32% in 2006, the 
macroeconomic variables explain 59% ((132-83)/83) of the increase in CEO 
compensation during the period 2001-2006. The effects can be even larger for 
individual firms, since the estimates presented here represent the average across the 
sample of firms.   18
7.  Robustness to Size, Industry and Simultaneity 
Compensation schemes vary across firms and the relevant macroeconomic variables, as 
well as their impacts, vary across firms. For example, international firms are likely to be 
sensitive to macroeconomic conditions abroad. We do not have the data to conduct 
firm-level studies here but we can distinguish between size groups and industries. 
Beginning with firms belonging to different levels of capitalization we run the 
regressions in Table 7 for Large-Cap firms separately. The results are very similar to the 
results presented for all firms in Table 7 in terms of coefficients as well as significance. 
Therefore we do not show the results for Large-Cap firms here. 
Turning to industries, the dummy for industry four (health care) was significant 
in most of the regressions so it would be of interest to investigate this industry further. 
However, there are only 5 firms with 40 observations in this industry. There are even 
fewer firms in Industry 3 for which the industry dummy was significant in several 
regressions. Financial institutions in general are different from corporations so we 
ignore this sector as well. 
  Finally, we take into account that performance could depend on compensation. 
After all, performance related compensation schemes are implemented with the 
objective of enhancing managerial effort on behalf of shareholders. If compensation 
schemes are successful, we expect the intercept term representing a constant rate of 
growth of compensation to be larger for firms with high sensitivity to performance. We 
cannot observe firm differences in this respect, however. It is also possible that firms 
with a stronger performance-compensation link will have relatively strong performance 
during periods when compensation is high as a result of manager’s greater effort on 
behalf of shareholders. If so, there is a potential simultaneity problem between Tobin’s 
Q, in particular, and compensation in the above regressions. 
Table 11 shows the results of regressions using a two stage procedure to explain 
compensation in comparison with the results of Model 5 in Table 7. The results for this 
model are also reproduced in Table 11. Instrumental variables, including sales and all 
anticipated and unanticipated macro variables in our data set, were used to estimate 
Tobin’s Q in the first stage. The results in Table 11 show that the coefficient for Tobin’s 
Q becomes almost three times as large as in the previous regressions and significant.   19
Thus, it is possible that there is some mutual dependence between performance and 
compensation. All other coefficients remain nearly unchanged, however. 
 
(Insert Table 11 Here) 
 
In order to further investigate the endogeneity of the Q, the Hausman Test, 
which tests the random effects model (REM) against the random effects model with 
instrumental variables (IVREM), is reported in Table 11. Based on the Hausman test, 
the random effects model with instrumental variables in the last column of the table is 
rejected. Thus, the exercise performed in the previous sections with respect to the role 
of macroeconomic factors should not be seriously affected by simultaneity. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
We have argued that managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value can become 
distorted or weakened by macroeconomic influences on performance and compensation. 
In particular, if macroeconomic conditions cannot be forecast for a period that allows 
production capacity and other aspects of corporate operations to be adjusted, then 
compensation should be made independent of macroeconomic influences. If substantial 
adjustment is feasible in response to expectations about the macroeconomy, 
compensation should be made independent of unanticipated macroeconomic influences. 
  Firms differ with respect to adjustability of structure, capacity and operations, 
and they differ in terms of their sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations. Analysis of 
the dependence of a particular firm’s performance and CEO-compensation on 
macroeconomic conditions requires data for performance, compensation, and relevant 
macroeconomic data for a substantial period. Lacking such data we are restricted to 
analyze macroeconomic influences on CEO compensation in 131 Swedish firms for the 
period 2001-2005 using the same set of macroeconomic factors for all firms. A smaller 
sample of firms for 2006 is analyzed as well. Using pooled data we identify the average 
impact of macroeconomic factors on Swedish firms. Industry level analysis is also 
constrained by an insufficient number of firms within each industry. 
  Three channels of macroeconomic influences on compensation are identified. 
Macroeconomic factors affect sales and Q-values, and they affect compensation through   20
other variables that affect compensation in a less systematic way than sales and Q. The 
macroeconomic factors we identify as important for the aggregate performance and 
compensation in the Swedish firms are the exchange rate, the interest rate and the 
inflation rate. These macroeconomic price variables are viewed as signals of underlying 
macroeconomic shocks. As such, they are easily observable and useful for decomposing 
performance and compensation into an “intrinsic” component and a macroeconomic 
component. 
  After estimation of the sensitivities of performance variables and compensation 
to the macroeconomic factors we use the coefficients in combination with 
macroeconomic developments each year to calculate how compensation would have 
developed had macroeconomic influences been filtered out each of the years 2001 
through 2006. The calculations show that compensation would have developed very 
differently had compensation been made independent of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Macroeconomic factors explain a 60 percent increase in compensation during the period. 
  Looking at the effects of macroeconomic variables on compensation as percent 
of bonus payments we observe even larger effects. In 2006 the macroeconomic 
contribution to compensation was almost as large as the bonus payments. 
Unanticipated factors explain a smaller part of compensation. In 2003 these 
factors explained 9 percent of compensation, while in 2004 the same factors reduced 
compensation by 3 percent. As percent of bonus payments the corresponding figures 
were larger; 59 percent and -7 percent, respectively. These figures may underestimate 
the impact of unanticipated macroeconomic developments on the average Swedish firm 
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Table 1  Mean and Median Compensation Levels: Salary and Bonus 2001-2006 
 
This table displays mean and median compensation levels (Million SEK) for the CEOs in Swedish firms 
during the period 2001-2005 plus 2006. Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of salary 
and bonus. 
 









2005    Year  
2006 
   Panel A:  All-Cap                                  (n=131)    (n=83) 
Mean 3.954  4.027  4.418  4.934  5.596    6.259 
Index 100  102  112  125  142    - 
Median 2.500  2.600  2.914  3.300  5.082    4.510 
Standard Deviation  4.010  3.708  4.111  4.381  5.082    4.966 
   Panel B:  Large-Cap                              (n=48)    (n=35) 
Mean 7.250  7.377  8.010  8.807  9.896    10.164 
Index 100  102  110  121  136    - 
Median 5.796  6.328  6.567  7.441  8.702    8.400 
Standard Deviation  5.020  4.299  4.861  4.898  5.992    5.318 
   Panel C:  Mid-Cap                                 (n=37)    (n=29) 
Mean 2.359  2.471  2.949  3.367  3.854    3.981 
Index 100  105  125  143  163    - 
Median 2.340  2.427  2.914  3.262  3.648    3.794 
Standard Deviation  0.934  1.010  1.327  2.076  2.059    1.873 
   Panel D:  Small-Cap                              (n=46)    (n=19) 
Mean 1.799  1.782  1.852  2.152  2.511    2.543 
Index 100  99  103  120  140    - 
Median 1.618  1.789  1.886  2.160  2.256    2.469 
Standard Deviation  1.005  0.698  0.682  0.999  1.332    0.949   23
Table 2  Mean and Median Compensation Levels: Salary and Bonus 2002-2006 
 
This table displays mean and median compensation levels (Million SEK) for the CEOs in Swedish firms 
during the period 2002-2005 plus 2006. Compensation in any given year is defined as salary or bonus. 
The firms included in this sample are the same as in Table 1. 
 







2005    Year  
2006 
   Panel A:  Salary                                       (n=131)    (n=83) 
Mean 3.350  3.569  3.628  3.803    4.443 
Index 100  107  108  114    - 
Median 2.400  2.528  2.561  2.745    3.442 
Standard Deviation  2.808  3.098  2.755  2.921    3.054 
   Panel B:  Bonus                                       (n=131)    (n=83) 
Mean 0.677  0.849  1.305  1.794    1.823 
Index 100  126  193  265    - 
Median 0.001  0.150  0.436  0.700    0.852 
Standard Deviation  1.507  1.678  2.172  2.868    2.769 
Number of the Firms 
without Paying Bonus   68 57  41  33    23 
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Table 3  Pooled and Cross-Sectional Regressions 2001-2006 without Macro Variables 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from both pooled and cross-sectional regressions from equation (1). The dependent variable is Log 
(Compensation). The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) information technology and 
telecommunication services, and 7) materials. The dummy 7 is dropped in the model.  
 














Log  (Sales)  0.277*** 0.291*** 0.268*** 0.238*** 0.292*** 0.302*** 0.264*** 
  (26.22) (12.66) (12.02) (9.93)  (11.98) (11.75) (8.34) 
Log  (Tobin’s  Q)  0.199*** 0.093  0.065  0.189*  0.266*** 0.294*** 0.161* 
  (5.23) (1.14) (0.77) (1.81) (2.72) (3.15) (1.58) 
Industry  Dummy  1  0.090 0.235 0.066 0.094 0.057 0.044 -0.038 
  (0.84) (0.98) (0.30) (0.36) (0.23) (0.17) (-0.14) 
Industry  Dummy  2  0.183 0.236 0.111 0.123 0.069 0.372 0.493 
  (0.84) (0.57) (0.28) (0.27) (0.17) (0.85) (1.11) 
Industry  Dummy  3  0.260***  0.320 0.077 0.243 0.351 0.300 0.335 
  (2.64) (1.44) (0.38) (1.04) (1.63) (1.32) (1.27) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.576***  0.759***  0.561**  0.590*  0.464  0.612**  0.335 
  (4.49) (2.65) (2.13) (1.88) (1.62) (2.07) (0.94) 
Industry  Dummy  5  0.120 0.277 0.089 0.096 0.103 0.043 0.170 
  (1.29) (1.32) (0.47) (0.43) (0.50) (0.20) (0.70) 
Industry  Dummy  6  0.117 0.314 0.067 -0.001  0.103 0.111 0.220 
  (1.17) (1.39) (0.33) (-0.00)  (0.46) (0.48) (0.84) 
Constant 10.703*** 10.257*** 10.880*** 11.319*** 10.488*** 10.385*** 11.071*** 
  (56.76) (24.77) (27.67) (26.25) (24.18) (22.46) (19.12) 
Observations  626 122 126 126 126 126  83 
Adjusted R
2  56% 59% 58% 48% 56% 54%  48% 
1. t-values are in round parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.   25
Table 4   Random Effects Model with either Industry or Time Dummy Variables 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from two random effects models for the period 2001-2005. 
The dependent variable is Log (Compensation). In the first model the industry dummies are used, while in 
the second model the time dummies are used. The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) 
financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) information technology and telecommunication services, and 7) 
materials. The time dummies are the years 2001-2005. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped in the 
first model, while the time dummy variable for the year 2001 is dropped in the second model.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Log (Sales)  0.263***  0.235*** 
 (15.02)  (13.98) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.166***  0.057* 
 (4.77)  (1.54) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.111  - 
 (0.55)   
Industry Dummy 2  0.153  - 
 (0.43)   
Industry Dummy 3  0.252  - 
 (1.35)   
Industry Dummy 4  0.569**  - 
 (2.42)   
Industry Dummy 5  0.132  - 
 (0.75)   
Industry Dummy 6  0.101  - 
 (0.54)   
Year Dummy 2002  -  0.076** 
   (2.11) 
Year Dummy 2003  -  0.172*** 
   (4.98) 
Year Dummy 2004  -  0.221*** 
   (6.36) 
Year Dummy 2005  -  0.305*** 
   (8.56) 
Constant 10.925***  11.379*** 
 (33.98)  (45.01) 
Observations 626  626 




1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.  26
Table 5  Random Effects Model using Salary, Bonus or Salary plus Bonus as 
Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from three random effects models. The dependent variable is 
Log (Salary), Log (Bonus), or Log (Salary plus Bonus). The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 
3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) information technology and telecommunication services, 
and 7) materials. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped in the models. The time period is 2002-2005. 
The regressions are based on the sample that firm pays bonus for the year.  
 





(Salary plus Bonus) 
Log (Sales)  0.260***  0.385***  0.293*** 
 (16.73)  (8.76)  (15.89) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  -0.006  0.484***  0.128*** 
 (-0.16)  (3.61)  (2.94) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.203  0.213  0.209 
 (1.37)  (0.51)  (1.15) 
Industry Dummy 2  0.219  0.242  0.295 
 (0.83)  (0.31)  (0.92) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.270*  1.390***  0.586*** 
 (1.94)  (3.59)  (3.42) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.733***  1.182**  0.870*** 
 (3.77)  (2.21)  (3.62) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.022  0.345  0.137 
 (0.17)  (0.96)  (0.86) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.210  0.477  0.313* 
 (1.50)  (1.22)  (1.83) 
Constant 10.874***  7.006***  10.498*** 
 (39.71)  (9.02)  (32.12) 
Observations 310  310  310 
Overall R
2 71%  36%  67% 
1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 



































Log (Salary and Bonus)  1   
Log  (Sales)  0.7162 1            
Log  (Tobin’s  Q)  0.0262  -0.1973  1          
Log (1+Market return)  0.0960  0.0012  -0.0022  1             
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -0.1541  -0.0404  -0.1751  -0.4951  1           
Log (1+Unanti. interest rate)  -0.0361  0.0169  -0.1498  0.0180  -0.0832  1         
Log (1+Anti. Δexchange rate)  0.0733  -0.0149  0.0279  0.7996  -0.2569  -0.4271  1       
Log (1+Unanti. Δexchange  rate)  -0.0260  0.0276 0.0447 -0.7244 -0.0392 0.3784 -0.9498  1     
Log (1+Anti. ΔCPI)  -0.0751 -0.0367  -0.1858 0.3001 0.4972  0.0574 0.5368  -0.7367  1   
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  -0.0798  -0.0005  -0.0316 -0.6661  0.4605 0.0997 -0.8416  0.7277  -0.4957  1   28
Table 7  Random Effects Model with Firm Specific Factors and Interest Rate, Exchange 
Rate and Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from five random effects models. The dependent variable is Log 
(Compensation). The industry dummy variables are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) 
industrials, 6) information technology and telecommunication services, and 7) materials. The industry dummy variable 
7 is dropped in the models. The time period is 2001-2005. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Log  (Sales)  0.245*** 0.246*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 
  (13.74) (13.83) (12.90) (12.91) (12.93) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.048  0.063*  0.062**  0.062*  0.076** 
  (1.25) (1.78) (1.75) (1.76) (2.15) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -12.163*** -11.947*** -12.092*** -12.092***  -15.009*** 
  (-7.01) (-6.93) (-7.02) (-7.02) (-7.15) 
Log (1+Unanti. interest rate)  -3.072  -  -  -  - 
  (-1.02)      
Log (1+Anti. Δexchange  rate) 4.657*** 5.654*** 5.664*** 5.608*** - 
  (2.57) (4.17) (3.68) (4.14)  
Log (1+Δexchange  rate)  - - - - -0.728*** 
      ( - 3 . 8 2 )  
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  4.657*  6.007**  5.997*** 5.996*** 5.149*** 
  (1.69) (2.48) (2.48) (2.48) (2.16) 
Industry  Dummy  1  0.185 0.176 0.282 0.282 0.273 
  (0.90) (0.86) (1.36) (1.36) (1.32) 
Industry  Dummy  2  0.099 0.104 0.059 0.059 0.063 
  (0.27) (0.29) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.222  0.224  0.339*  0.339*  0.340** 
  (1.17) (1.19) (1.75) (1.75) (1.76) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.640**  0.628***  0.673***  0.673***  0.660*** 
  (2.67) (2.63) (2.85) (2.85) (2.80) 
Industry  Dummy  5  0.155 0.151 0.165 0.165 0.161 
  (0.86) (0.85) (0.93) (0.93) (0.91) 
Industry  Dummy  6  0.128 0.121 0.204 0.204 0.197 
  (0.68) (0.65) (1.08) (1.08) (1.04) 
Export  Dummy  - - 0.207**  0.206**  0.206** 
    (2.17)  (2.17)  (2.17) 
Export Dummy×       
   Log (1+Anti. Δexchange  rate)  - - -0.107  - - 
    (-0.08)    
Constant  11.647*** 11.633*** 11.622*** 11.623*** 11.725*** 
  (33.89) (33.94) (34.35) (34.38) (34.61) 
Observations  626 626 626 626  626 










1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.   29
Table 8  Random Effects Model with Tobin’s Q or Sales as Depended Variable 
and Interest Rate, Exchange Rate and Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from two random effects models. The industry dummy 
variables are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) information 
technology and telecommunication services, and 7) materials. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped 
in the models. The time period is 2001-2005. 
 
  Q Equation  Sales Equation 
Log (Sales)  -0.038***  - 
  (-2.03)  
Log (Tobin’s Q)  - -0.079 
   (-1.57) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -17.531*** -11.454*** 
  (-7.46) (-4.06) 
Log (1+Δexchange rate)  -0.101 0.629*** 
  (-0.45) (2.46) 
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  5.418*** -0.653 
  (1.95) (-0.20) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.639*** 0.627 
  (3.07) (0.749 
Industry Dummy 2  -0.298 -2.029 
  (-0.82)   (-1.37) 
Industry Dummy 3  -0.079 -0.487 
  (-0.40) (-0.61) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.939*** -2.532*** 
  (3.99) (-2.689 
Industry Dummy 5  0.241 -0.586 
  (1.36) (-0.81) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.526*** -1.823*** 
  (2.76) (-2.38) 
Export Dummy  0.058 1.460*** 
  (0.60) (3.88) 
Constant  1.384*** 15.119*** 
 (3.98)  (20.28) 
Observations 626  626 




1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. 
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Table 9a  Contribution of the Anticipated and Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation (Interest Rate, Exchange 
Rate, and Inflation) 
 
This table reports the predicted anticipated and unanticipated macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 2001-2005 using Model 5 in Table 7, and the models 
in Table 8. The macroeconomic factors are risk free return, exchange rate, and inflation. In the column (4) and column (6), w1 and w2 are the coefficients for the variables Log 
(Tobin’s Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 7, Model 5. The average total macro effect to the bonus in the period 2002-2005 is 20.22%.  
 
Year 
Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation; Salary 
plus Bonus, given 
Q and Sales 
Macro Effects in 
the Q Equation 
Macro Effects in 
the Sales Equation
Total Macro Effects 
to   
Salary and Bonus 
(1)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation to the 
Bonus Only 
Total Macro Effects 
to the Bonus Only 
(5)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2001 -15.14% -8.83% -3.36%  -16.60%  -  - 
2002  -1.29% -7.88% -9.31%  -4.09% -7.69%  -10.49% 
2003  2.79% -11.32% -21.16%  -3.07%  14.49%  8.63% 
2004  7.25% 2.67% 1.73%  7.86%  27.39%  28.00% 
2005  15.91% 20.00% 14.99%  20.97% 49.65%  54.71% 
2001-2005  2.54% -0.27% -2.72%  1.88%  -  - 
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Table 9b    Contribution of the Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation (Exchange Rate, and Inflation) 
 
This table reports the predicted anticipated and unanticipated macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 2001-2005 using Model 5 in Table 7, and the Models 
in Table 8. The macroeconomic factors are exchange rate, and inflation. In the compensation and sales equations, the predicted figures are the values in million SEK, while in 
the Q equation they are the ratios. In the columns (4) and (6), w1 and w2 are the coefficients estimated from Model 5 in Table 7 for the variable Log (Tobin’s Q) and Log 




Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation; Salary 
plus Bonus, given 
Q and Sales 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects in 
the Q Equation 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects in 
the Sales Equation
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to the 
Salary and Bonus 
(1)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation to the 
Bonus Only 
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to 
the Bonus Only 
(5)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2001 -1.26% 6.34% 6.30%  0.71%  -  - 
2002  6.82% -0.76% -4.83%  5.62% 40.59%  39.40% 
2003 11.81% 0.67%  -12.47%  8.92%  61.43%  58.53% 
2004  -1.20% -7.79% -5.03%  -2.98% -4.55%  -6.33% 
2005 -1.69% 0.13% 1.72%  -1.27%  -5.27%  -4.86% 
2001-2005  2.54% -0.27% -2.72%  1.88%  -  - 
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Table 10  Contribution of the Anticipated and Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation for the year 2006 (Interest 
Rate, Exchange Rate, and Inflation) 
 
This table reports the predicted compensation for the year 2006 by using the parameter coefficient estimated in the period 2001-2005, Model 5 in Table 7, and Models 1 and 2 
in Table 8. The macroeconomic factors are risk free return, exchange rate, and inflation. In the columns (4) and (6), w1 and w2 are the coefficients estimated from Model 5 in 
Table 7 for the variable Log (Tobin’s Q) and Log (Sales), respectively. 
 
Year 
Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation; Salary 
plus Bonus, given 
Q and Sales 
Macro Effects in 
the Q Equation 
Macro Effects in 
The Sales Equation
Total Macro Effects 
to the  
Salary and Bonus 
(1)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
Macro Effects in 
the Compensation 
Equation to the 
Bonus Only 
Total Macro Effects 
to the Bonus Only 
(5)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   10a:  Anticipated ant Unanticipated Macro Effects 
2006  25.42% 29.31% 18.00%  31.89% 87.28%  93.75% 
   10b:  Unanticipated Macro Effects 
2006  3.60% 4.65% 0.27%  4.01%  12.35%  12.77%   33
Table  11  Instrumental Variables Estimation of Performance Variables in 
Model with Firm Specific Factors and Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, and 
Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
 
This table compares the parameter estimations from the random effects model with and without 
instrumental variables. The dependent variable is Log (Compensation). The industry dummy variables 
are: 1) consumer goods, 2) energy, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) information 
technology and telecommunication services, and 7) materials. The industry dummy variable 7 is 
dropped in the models. The time period is 2001-2005. 
 
  Model 5 as  
in Table 7 
Model 5  
as in Table 7 
IV 
Log (Sales)  0.235***  0.227*** 
 (12.68)  (9.93) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.074**  0.229*** 
 (2.10)  (2.67) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -15.039***  -12.463*** 
 (-7.13)  (-5.06) 
Log (1+Δexchange rate)  -0.727***  -0.703*** 
 (-3.80)  (-3.80) 
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI) 5.155***  4.301*** 
 (2.39)  (1.84) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.274  0.182 
 (1.28)  (0.59) 
Industry Dummy 2  0.061  0.079 
 (0.16)  (0.15) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.340**  0.344 
 (1.70)  (1.21) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.660***  0.476 
 (2.43)  (1.36) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.161  0.117 
 (0.88)  (0.45) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.196  0.087 
 (1.00)  (0.31) 
Export Dummy  0.207**  0.215** 
 (2.12)  (1.56) 
Constant 11.741*  11.737*** 
 (34.01)  (25.91) 
Observations 626  626 
R-squared 58.4%  58.2% 
Hausman test:  Chi-squared (11) = 5.22  
Prob> Chi-squared = 0.951 
1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses.  
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. 
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Figure 1  Changes in Average CEO Compensation 2001-2005 
 
The figure displays the changes in average CEO Compensation in different sizes of firms: Large-Cap, 
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